Contracts

The launchpad runs on Injective EVM, chain ID 1776 — the same chain as injective-1, seen from its EVM side. Deployed on 2026-09-23 from block 184234133, every contract verified on Blockscout. Any other address presented as one of these is not.

The owner and the treasury are, for now, the deploying wallet 0x5f1A0A240136cc0CD5C48A6EDb7d185C27f37713. Not audited.

Buying with INJ: PairZap

A coin here trades against another coin, so someone holding only INJ has two trades to make. PairZap makes them as one transaction: an aggregator's route between INJ and the pair asset (LI.FI's router on Injective, fixed at deployment), then the coin's own Infinity pool. A coin paired with wINJ needs no route at all — the INJ is wrapped. You sign a single minimum that bounds both legs; if either falls short the whole transaction reverts and you keep what you had.

It has no owner and no settings, holds nothing between trades, and keeps no allowance standing. It is a convenience, not a gate: the pool is an ordinary Infinity pool, and anything that can trade one can trade your coin without it. It has not been audited.

Your coin's own contract

Every coin launched here is a PairToken, and every one of them will show as verified without anyone submitting it. That is not a courtesy — PairToken takes no constructor arguments (it calls back into the launchpad for its name, symbol and supply), so the creation bytecode is byte-identical every time. Verifying the first coin lets the explorer match every other one, including coins that do not exist yet.

What that source says, and what it therefore cannot do: fixed supply set once in the constructor, no mint function, no transfer tax, no blacklist, no pause, no owner.

External contracts it uses

Every one of these was read off chain 1776 on 22 September 2026 before it was written down — Choice's Infinity contracts by their own views and code size, the tokens by symbol and decimals, API3's proxies by latestRoundData.

wINJ, USDT, USDC and wETH are bank-module tokens: their balances live in Injective's bank module and the ERC-20 contract reaches them through a precompile. On chain they behave as ordinary ERC-20s. The one consequence worth knowing is that no local test chain can run them, which is why the test suite uses mocks for the tokens while running the real Infinity contracts.

Calls worth knowing

Before launching

// Non-reverting. Returns whether it would be allowed, and why not if not.
registry.status(address quote)
  returns (bool eligible, Decision decision, Report report)

// The bar this particular asset has to clear — $2,000 if listed, $5,000 if not.
registry.requiredDepthUsdE8(address quote) returns (uint256)

// Make a pool count as evidence for the coin on its non-anchor side. Anyone can call.
clGate.registerPool(PoolKey key)
clGate.registerLaunch(address token)            // the pool a launch here opened
clGate.probe(PoolKey key) returns (uint256 usdE8, address anchor)  // one live reading, no state

Launching

launchpad.launch(LaunchConfig cfg) payable returns (address token, bytes32 poolId)
launchpad.predictToken(address creator, bytes32 salt) returns (address)
launchpad.launchFee() returns (uint256)

LaunchConfig carries, beyond the obvious:

The pool's key is Infinity's: (currency0, currency1, hooks, poolManager, fee, parameters), with the hook at zero, the pool manager Choice's, and the tick spacing packed into parameters. Its id is the keccak256 of that key, ABI-encoded.

After launching

// Anyone can call. Proceeds only ever reach the recorded recipient, the sink and the treasury.
feeVault.collect(address token)

// Creator only. Both take effect from the next collect.
feeVault.setFeeRoute(address token, FeeRoute route)
feeVault.setFeeRecipient(address token, address recipient)

// Reads
launchpad.launchOf(address token)                              // a public mapping: an unnamed tuple
feeVault.launchOf(address token) returns (Launch)              // includes the pool's full PoolKey
feeVault.positionOf(address token) returns (uint128 liquidity) // an Infinity position keeps no tokensOwed
feeVault.feeRouteOf(address token) returns (FeeRoute)
feeVault.feeRecipientOf(address token) returns (address)
feeVault.owed(address token, address who) returns (uint256)    // a payout that could not be pushed
feeVault.claim(address token)                                  // collect one

Where the liquidity lock actually lives

There is no lock contract and no locked LP token, because Infinity has no LP tokens at all. A position only becomes an NFT when the CLPositionManager wraps it; underneath it is a slot in the CLPoolManager keyed by (owner, tickLower, tickUpper, salt), and the fee vault seeded that slot directly. The usual "liquidity locked" detectors look for LP tokens or position NFTs sent to a burn address or a locker, and here there is nothing of the sort for them to find.

What holds instead is a property of FeeVault, and with its source published you can check it rather than believe it: no code path in the vault ever passes a negative liquidityDelta. Collecting fees calls modifyLiquidity with a delta of exactly zero, which credits the fees earned so far and touches nothing else. There is no withdraw, no emergency exit, and no owner function that adds one. Anyone can read the position with feeVault.positionOf(token), or straight off the pool manager with CLPoolManager.getLiquidity(poolId, feeVault, tickLower, tickUpper, 0). The float cannot come back out — not by the creator, not by us.

Owner powers

The owner can retune the depth bars, the fee bounds, the launch fee, the treasury, the buyback sink, the curated list, the gate, its sampling and the hooks it accepts. It cannot touch a launch's liquidity, change an existing launch's creator share, or redirect a creator's fees.

Ownership transfer is two-step everywhere: a handover that is never accepted leaves the current owner in place rather than sending the protocol to a wrong address.

Choice Exchange owns the Infinity contracts themselves, behind its own timelock. It cannot move a position the fee vault holds, but it sets its pool manager's protocol fee, which is zero for hookless pools today.

The owner should be a multisig behind a timelock, and the contracts do not enforce that themselves.

None of this has been audited.